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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new evidence on foreign-currency debt of non-financial companies 
in six Latin-American countries, including years in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis. 
The paper differentiates between total debt and financial debt in foreign currency. Main 
results indicate that some firm-specific features are key to understand foreign currency 
debt. Exporting firms behave differently between total foreign-currency debt and finan-
cial currency debt. Exporters hold more total foreign-currency debt than the average firm 
while they hold less financial foreign-currency debt. Foreign-owned firms hold less total 
debt in foreign currency. Macroeconomic variables only play some role when interacting 
with specific firm characteristics. 
Keywords: foreign-currency debt, firm-level characteristics.
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Resulta difícil referirse a Enrique Kawamura en tiempo pasado. En quienes tuvi-
mos la suerte de interactuar más o menos cercanamente con él perdurará el vívi-
do recuerdo de alguien excepcional, por intelecto, valores y calidades personales. 
Conocí a Enrique hace unos cuantos años, como una figura saliente en un des-
tacado grupo de estudiantes. Me ha quedado grabada la memoria de un aula de 
la UBA donde el  joven Kawamura, sentado en las primeras filas a mano derecha 
(por algún motivo me viene en mente la clara imagen), se atareaba  tomando 
notas y, cada tanto, sacaba los ojos del apunte con una mirada de entusiasmo 
cuando el tema de la conversación viraba a cosas como las restricciones inter-
temporales de presupuesto. Rápidamente se percibía que ahí había alguien para 
quien las nociones aparentemente abstractas tenían algo así como una signifi-
cación personal, y era capaz de hacer del razonamiento riguroso un compromiso 
mantenido. No podía sorprender que se sintiera llamado a una fructífera activi-
dad académica.
Tuve el privilegio de poder trabajar con Enrique en varios proyectos de inves-
tigación. Fueron experiencias que valoré especialmente. Colaborar con Enrique 
era interactuar con un colega siempre dispuesto a explorar ideas libremente, 
y a disfrutar de la búsqueda de argumentos, incluso cruzando fronteras entre 
disciplinas, mientras mantenía su apego al análisis económico claro y preciso. 
Diversión, búsqueda abierta y trabajo serio: todo eso formaba parte de las facetas 
del Enrique economista, que se manifestaron en su numerosa producción. 
La rectitud de conducta, sin vueltas ni calificaciones, fue otro de sus rasgos 
propios. Pero eso no lo hizo ni solemne ni inabordable. Tenía barrio, y se nota-
ba. Por algún motivo, recuerdo con especial afecto su lado futbolero: junto con 
una maraña de libros y papeles académicos, en su oficina destacaba un poster 
recordando el campeonato que ganó Huracán con el famoso equipo de 1973. Se 
preocupaba Enrique por el Globo y, sin perder su ánimo analítico, seguía con 
cuidado sus altibajos, deportivos y otros. 
Se nos fue una persona entrañable, y un economista de primera. Es un eufemis-
mo decir que lo vamos a extrañar, y mucho. 
Daniel Heymann
En memoria de Enrique kawamura, presente en esta edición
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new evidence on foreign-currency debt of non-financial compa-
nies in six Latin-American countries, including years in the aftermath of the sub-pri-
me crisis. The paper differentiates between total debt and financial debt in foreign 
currency. Main results indicate that some firm-specific features are key to unders-
tand foreign currency debt. Exporting firms behave differently between total fore-
ign-currency debt and financial currency debt. Exporters hold more total foreign-
currency debt than the average firm while they hold less financial foreign-currency 
debt. Foreign-owned firms hold less total debt in foreign currency. Macroeconomic 
variables only play some role when interacting with specific firm characteristics. 
Keywords: foreign-currency debt, firm-level characteristics.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo presenta nueva evidencia sobre determinantes de pasivos en moneda 
extranjera de empresas en seis países de Latinoamérica, incluyendo períodos poste-
riores a la crisis sub-prime, diferenciando entre pasivos totales y financieros en mo-
neda extranjera. Los resultados principales indican que ciertas características espe-
cíficas son claves para entender estas deudas. Firmas que exportan deciden diferen-
temente entre pasivos totales y financieros en moneda extranjera, manteniendo más 
deuda total y menos deuda financiera en moneda extranjera que la firma promedio. 
Empresas de propiedad extranjera mantienen menos pasivos totales en moneda ex-
tranjera. Las variables macroeconómicas sólo importan cuando se las interactúa con 
tipos de empresas. 
Palabras clave: deuda en moneda extranjera, características de la empresa.
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I. Introduction
There exists some evidence of an increase in foreign-currency borrowing 
(mainly through foreign-currency bond issues) by companies in Emerg-
ing-Market countries in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 sub-prime crisis 
due to low interest rates.1 This contrast the debt de-dollarization process 
between 2000 and 2010, which raised new concerns especially in the poli-
cy-making discussion. The basic reason for this concern goes back to well-
known problematic experiences that high debt dollarization implied in 
several LAC countries during the nineties.2
This work presents evidence of foreign-currency debt in public com-
panies in Latin America during the new century, using a hand-collected 
database from the companion paper (García-Cicco and Kawamura, 2016, 
2018). The countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mex-
ico and Perú. The database includes the fraction of total foreign-currency 
debt and of financial foreign-currency debt. We explore possible determi-
nants of each of these two variables as a function of firm-level as well as 
macroeconomic variables (and interactions among some of them). In this 
way, we generate new facts on which specific factors may explain the level 
of foreign currency debt. 
The main results are as follows. Export status is a salient characteris-
tic that affects the decision of taking debt in foreign currency. Yet, firms 
that export (on average) behave differently depending on the type of debt: 
exporters show higher total foreign currency debt, but lower financial for-
eign-currency debt. This suggests the role of trade debt in foreign currency 
for exporters. 
Another specific type of firms that merits some attention is the set of 
foreign-owned firms. Regarding total foreign-currency debt, the average 
foreign-owned firm shows lower levels of that type of debt than the aver-
1 There is a growing literature presenting empirical evidence on this process. See, e.g,, Gozzi et al (2015)
2 See, e.g, the IDB 2014 Macroeconomic Report. Yet, another reason for such new warning messages was 
the increasing evidence about the destination of the receipts from those bond issues. Indeed, papers like 
e.g., Hattori and Shin (2009), Chung et al (2014), Shin and Zhao (2013), Caballero, Panizza and Powell 
(2016), Bruno and Shin (2017) and the companion paper by García-Cicco and Kawamura (2018), docu-
ment that non-financial corporations used a big share of the receipts from such bond issues to increase 
their liquidity positions in local banks or other financial intermediaries, acting in this case as a branch 
of such intermediaries.
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age firm in the sample. This is a bit more puzzling result, since not all for-
eign-owned firms are exporters. A couple of possible explanations include 
either liability management directly set in headquarters or local manage-
ment being averse to exchange-rate risks induced by total foreign currency 
debt. Of course, they need further confirmation with research that is out-
side the scope of this note. On the other hand, the status of foreign-owned 
firm per-se does not behave differently from the average firm regarding 
financial debt in foreign-currency. Yet, that same type of firm interacted 
with other features such as the level of foreign-currency assets tends to 
behave differently regarding financial debt in foreign currency than the 
average firm, depending of that specific feature. 
In terms of macroeconomic variables, they also play a role in explain-
ing both types of foreign currency debt only when interacted with firm-
specific features. This reveals a certain degree of heterogeneity regarding 
the reaction of different types of firms to common macroeconomic shocks. 
Major macro variables that affects foreign-currency debt are domestic in-
terest rate, interest-rate spreads and the level of financial depth measured 
as the ratio between credit and GDP. 
This note is a contribution to the literature analyzing determinants of 
debt by currency for companies. Papers by Allayanis et al (2003), Bena-
vente et al (2003), Gozzi et al (2010) and Mizen et al (2012) are examples 
of studies analyzing determinants of foreign-currency debt. Those pa-
pers consider firm characteristics different from this paper. More closely, 
Brown et al (2011) for transition economies and Mora et al (2013) for firms 
in Lebanon consider the role of export status (and the first of those papers 
also considers foreign-owned firms). The common result in their case is 
that export firms tend to show higher foreign currency debt. Yet none of 
those papers differentiate between total debt and financial debt in foreign 
currency, which is the case in this note. 
The rest of the note is as follows. Section II presents the basic database 
characteristics, descriptive statistics and facts about the currency composi-
tion of debt (including the analysis of its possible determinants). Section III 
presents the main analysis on the determinants of foreign-currency debt, in-
cluding a more detailed relationship with the literature. Section IV concludes.
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II. Data sources, sample, summary statistics and facts on foreign-
currency debt in the 2000’s
II.1 Data sources
As stated in the introduction, this note uses the hand-collected data in Gar-
cía-Cicco and Kawamura (2016, 2018) from the annual financial statements 
downloaded from the websites of a subset of publicly-listed companies. As 
explained in that paper, the process of data collection started by looking at 
the Economatica database, the standard source used in other similar studies 
on Latin American firms given the well-recognized representativeness of 
the sample in that database relative to the universe of public companies in 
those countries. That base contains major accounting variables of 1561 ma-
jor public companies from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, United 
States and Venezuela, mostly for the period 2003-2013. However, such da-
tabase lacks information of key disaggregated variables such as the export 
status (with very few exceptions), and the use of currency and interest-rate 
derivatives and others that are needed in García-Cicco and Kawamura 
(2018). Economatica is then the baseline database to complete a first list of 
public firms in LAC countries for which some accounting data is available. 
The data collection also uses other public sources of accounting infor-
mation (such as the website of financial regulators, in the case of Colombia, 
given that in Economatica there much fewer firms of that country included 
in that database). Thus, we compiled a dataset including a quite detailed 
accounting data on assets and liabilities composition, as well as some in-
formation on export status, ownership and basic corporate-governance in-
dicators. Yet, this database also presents a high fraction of missing values 
for some years for some of those more disaggregated variables. Therefore, 
the dataset used here includes annual data for 127 companies from Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, for a period between 1995 
and 2014, although the number of observations for years before 2003 is 
low. It is clearly an unbalanced panel database.
The regression exercises also control for several macroeconomic vari-
ables. The major ones include several interest rates, the ratio between 
domestic credit and GDP and nominal exchange rates. The source for all 
these macro variables is the World Bank database. 
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II.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics on two sets of selected variables of 
interest in the analysis performed below. Panel A shows statistics for firm-
level variables, while panel B shows those for selected macro variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
A: descriptive statistics. Firm level Variables Sample Size Mean Std Dev Min Max
Total foreign currency debt as a fraction of 
total debt 800 0.3853 0.2829 0 0.9964
Financial foreign currency debt as a fraction of 
total financial debt
1097 0.5935 0.3586 0 1
Profits/Losses due to FEx valuations divided 
by assets 1056 -0.0047 0.0350 -0.6958 0.2005
Gross Profits/Losses divided by assets 1506 0.2004 0.1377 -0.0812 1,033,004
      
B: descriptive statistics. Macro Variables Sample Size Mean Std Dev Min Max
Lending Domestic Interest Rate (%) 1571 24.3114 20.21144 0 86.3633
Lending USA Interest Rate (%) 1571 5.0748 2.1015 3.25 9.2333
Variation of the exchange rate 1439 17 133 -388.46 573.61
Overnight Domestic Interest Rate (%) 1434 8.9711 6.1653 1.4005 33.3033
Overnight USA Interest Rate (%) 1369 1.5697 1.8027 0.0922 5.1586
Domestic-credit-to-GDP ratio (%) 1571 37.1352 21 9 109
Source: García-Cicco and Kawamura (2016). 
From panel A the fraction of the total debt denominated in foreign 
currency seems lower than the fraction of the total financial debt de-
nominated in foreign currency by about twenty percentage points. Gar-
cía-Cicco and Kawamura (2018) presents two possible interpretations. 
The first is related to the currency denomination of trade debt, most of 
which may be denominated in domestic currency. The second interpre-
tation comes from a possible lack of detailed information on total debt 
in foreign currency for some firms. Also, the variation coefficient of the 
financial foreign-currency debt measure is higher than the total foreign-
currency debt. This suggests a higher heterogeneity of currency denomi-
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nation in financial debt relative to total debt, although such difference 
may not be crucial.
The third and fourth variables of panel A refer to two performance 
variables. One is related to profits due to variations in the exchange rate, 
the other is linked to global profits. The third variable presents the statis-
tics of the ratio between the profits or losses coming from exchange rate 
variations and total assets. On average the ratio is slightly negative, al-
though showing a very high variability, with a very wide range of possible 
values in this sample. The fourth variable refers to the average of the ratio 
between total profits / losses over total assets. The mean is undoubtedly 
positive, although the minimum value is also negative but smaller than 
the minimum of the other performance variable. 
Finally, panel B presents some statistics of major macroeconomic vari-
ables used in regression analysis. These have been selected according to 
the literature studying determinants and consequences of currency com-
position of debt referred in the introduction. 
II.3 Summary of stylized facts on foreign-currency debt (based on 
García-Cicco and Kawamura (2018))
The database allows for a time-series close view to the dynamics of foreign-
currency debt for the firms in our sample. Here we provide a summary of 
those facts, which can be more closely viewed in the companion paper:
• Between 2000 and 2011 there is a trend towards a reduction in to-
tal foreign-currency debt, with a partial reversion in 2012. Still the 
values of the mean and median of this indicator are still quite high, 
ranging from a minimum slightly below 30%, up to maximum 
37.5% on average.
• Regarding financial currency debt, qualitatively the pattern is simi-
lar to that of total foreign currency debt, including the reversion of 
a declining trend since 2000 in the year 2014, although the values 
are higher than those of the total foreign currency debt. Indeed, the 
average of financial currency debt shows a minimum value of 50%. 
• When looking at both series by country (cross-firm averages), it is 
possible to uncover some differences across them. Regarding to-
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tal foreign-currency debt, while for four of the countries the trend 
is declining in the 2000’s, Brazil and Colombia seem to be the ex-
ception. Yet, for those other four countries there is a reversion in 
the second decade of the 2000’s. Regarding the cross-firm average 
financial foreign-currency debt, Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican 
firms show a declining trend in the period 2000-20010. On the other 
hand, the average Argentine and Peruvian firm displays a sharp 
decrease in this fraction between 2001 and 2002 (coinciding with 
the end of the peg in December 2001 in Argentina) but a partial re-
covery between 2002 and 2006, leading to a posterior drop between 
2006 and 2011. Colombian companies show a milder and shorter 
reversion (only between 2011 and 2013). 
III. Foreign-currency debt: correlation with other firm-level and 
macro variables
This section presents the main results from OLS-based regressions applied 
to an equation relating the currency composition of both total and finan-
cial debt with other firm-level variables, both alone and interacted with 
some of the macro variables included in table 1. 
III.1. The equation to be estimated
The existing literature on the determinants of foreign currency debt3 pro-
vides an approximation through the regression equation that “explains” 
the fraction of foreign currency debt. The basic equation is:
 
 (1)
In equation (1) the dependent variable Y is alternatively the share of 
total debt in foreign currency, in a first set of regressions, and the share 
of total financial debt in foreign currency, in a second set of regressions. 
The right hand side of equation 1 includes a vector X of firm-level control 
3 See, e.g., Cowan et al (2005), Kamil (2009), Brown et al (2011), Gozzi et al (2012), Mizen et al (2012) 
and Mora et al (2013) among others. 
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variables, part of which comes from the literature. These control vari-
ables include the natural log of assets, total leverage, the fraction of sales 
exported abroad, the annual rate of growth of total sales, the fraction of 
short-term debt and a dummy variable stating whether the firm is for-
eign owned or not. 
The second term measures the effect of each of the firm-level control vari-
ables in X (excluding the dummy variable of foreign ownership) interacted 
with a dummy variable d that is alternatively one of three firm-specific dum-
mies. The first dummy considers whether the firm is within the 50% largest 
firms. The second dummy considers whether the firm exports or not.4 The 
last dummy is the foreign-ownership variable that is already included in X 
in the first part of the right hand side. Coefficients g then measures how the 
influence of each control variable in X on the decision of borrowing in for-
eign currency (in the next year) depends on a firm characteristic. 
The third term of the right hand side shows the effect of a subset of the 
vector X including only the export-to-sales ratio, the log of assets and the 
foreign-ownership dummy. This is the vector x. These three variables are 
interacted with a set of four macroeconomic (country-wise) variables, the 
four of which comprise the vector m. The macro variables are the follow-
ing: the domestic (lending) interest rate in domestic currency, the spread 
between the latter and the US interbank rate, and the ratio between total 
domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. It also includes 
year dummies. 
III.2. Results
Tables 2 and 3 below show the results corresponding to the OLS estimates 
of equation 1.5 Table 2 takes the share of total debt in foreign currency as 
the dependent variable while Table 3 considers the share of total financial 
debt over total financial debt as the dependent variable. 
4 In the interactions with this latter dummy variable we also consider multiplying this export dummy 
with another corresponding to the status of being a commodity exporter.
5 Each table reports only a subset of the coefficients and standard deviation measures, corresponding 
mostly to statistically significant results, especially for the variables where the significance remains after 
adding all controls.
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In the case of the share of total debt in foreign currency, the size effect 
(measured by the coefficient of lagged total assets) is clearly significant in 
almost all specifications. Another variable correlated with foreign-curren-
cy total debt is the fraction of sales abroad, which shows a positive cor-
relation is most of the specifications except for that controlling for foreign 
ownership. 
Firms that inform to export a fraction of their sales (although do not 
necessarily report the fraction of those exported sales in all cases) seem 
also to show particular features regarding foreign-currency financial debt 
behavior. On average, those firms borrow more in foreign currency than 
the average, even more the higher is the stock of assets held abroad, or else 
if the firm is also foreign owned, but less the bigger their assets are. 
An important characteristic that correlates to the debt-in-foreign-
currency share is the foreign ownership dummy. The latter, both alone 
(lagged) and interacted with several other variables, appears to be statisti-
cally significant. The basic main result is that the average foreign-owned 
firm presents less total debt in foreign currency than the average firm. 
This result merits some careful interpretation. Given that not all foreign-
owned firms export, then the trade-debt argument that applies to export-
ers may not be valid here. The most straightforward interpretation is that 
the financial strategy by foreign-owned firms are determined overseas (at 
headquarters of the major shareholder) but the latter would merit confir-
mation by further research that may include surveys to CFOs. 
Another interpretation may have to do with lowering exchange-rate 
risk for foreign shareholders. Indeed, being a foreign-owned firm in Latin 
America, higher foreign-currency debt exposes that firm to higher risk in 
profitability. Thus, the financial management of the firm may have strong 
incentives to reduce such risk. Foreign-owned firms seem to react more to 
variations in the interest rate spread than other types of firms.6 This seems 
consistent with the trend observed during the first decade of the XXI cen-
tury about both interest rate spreads and foreign currency debt decreas-
6 This seems the case by looking at the positive coefficient of the interaction variable lagSpreadIR_FO, 
for example
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ing. Yet, this effect may be mitigated by the effects of domestic interest 
rates (whose coefficient is positive in several specifications). 
Macroeconomic variables seem to matter only when interacting them 
with firm-level characteristics such as foreign-ownership or export status. 
For example, interest rate spread movements become relevant for foreign-
owned firms. This result makes sense whenever the management of such 
firms need to follow certain policies coming from the foreign headquar-
ters. Of course, this depends on the degree of autonomy of the local man-
agement, a feature that is absent from our database. For commodity ex-
porters a higher spread seems to decrease total foreign currency debt. This 
result seems a bit odd, although we may attribute it to a sample-size issue. 
Regarding factors correlated with the share of financial debt in foreign 
currency, Table 3 below shows the results of the OLS regression referred 
to equation (1). 
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As in the case of total debt in foreign currency, table 3 shows that size 
measured by the log of assets is still a key variable correlated to the depen-
dent variable here. Unlike in the case of total debt in foreign currency, the 
first lag of financial leverage is strongly correlated to the financial debt in 
foreign currency share. This may be read as a mechanical result. Yet, the 
same variable was not correlated to total debt in foreign currency. This 
suggests that a firm with higher levels of financial debt may need to refi-
nance part of such debt in foreign currency, hence generating the positive 
correlation. 
For firms exporting, the fraction of sales exported abroad in this case 
appears to be significant when interacted with the share of short term debt 
of last period. Yet, the coefficient on the export status is negative, suggest-
ing that the average exporting firm takes less financial debt in foreign cur-
rency than the non-exporting ones. This suggests that the exporting firms 
tend to take trade-debt in foreign-currency rather than financial debt. This 
also suggests that the exporters in our sample presents enough reputation 
with trade-partners to avoid financing those trades with financial debt. 
Yet, this effect is ameliorated when exporting firms have high levels of 
assets in foreign currency. Probably, the availability of foreign-currency 
assets may imply that such exporters may find less risky to finance part 
of their trade (or maybe, expenditures that are applied, for example, to 
search for new markets) with financial debt. This hypothesis would need 
further confirmation in future research. 
Foreign-ownership status per se does not imply a difference in the fi-
nancial foreign-currency debt holdings relative to the average. Yet, when 
considering those foreign-owned firms with high assets in foreign cur-
rency they seem to be propense to take financial debt in foreign-currency. 
One possible interpretation is that these firms may be involved in inter-
national financial trading (being intrinsically non-financial firms) so they 
may take debt in foreign-currency to just to accumulate foreign-currency 
assets for future trading. Yet, there may be other motives for this result. 
Again, with more information this and other hypotheses may be tested 
more accurately. Notice also that foreign-owned firms with large amount 
of total assets and those with higher exports tend to take less financial debt 
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in foreign-currency. The second of these two results resembles the fact that 
exporters on average take less financial debt in foreign-currency. 
Finally, regarding the role played by macroeconomic variables, as in 
the case of the total foreign-currency debt case, they seem to matter only 
for specific types of companies. A higher interest rate spread increases the 
foreign-currency financial debt in foreign-owned firms. This again may 
be part of a financial strategy coming from headquarters. For exporting, 
foreign-owned firms, the effect is even higher, although not so for for-
eign-owned commodity exporters. Relative to the domestic interest rate, 
for foreign-owned companies that export with high amount of assets, an 
increase of such variable reduces the financial debt in foreign-currency. 
Yet, for foreign-owned commodity exporters the result is the reverse. This 
result seems a bit puzzling, since it is not obvious why exporting com-
modities changes those incentives to increase or decrease the holdings of 
financial debt in foreign currency. This is clearly left for future research. 
III.3. Relationship with the literature
Comparing these findings with part of the literature, Allayanis et al (2003) 
analyze determinants of different types of debt currency-denomination for 
Asian companies in the 90’s. That paper shows that several macroeconomic 
variables influence the decision of having more debt in foreign currency. 
Among firm-specific variables, market-to-book ratio, and foreign cash im-
plies higher incentives to borrow in foreign-currency. In this regard, this 
paper obtains some comparable results when looking at the foreign-owned 
assets in some of our regressions, but only for certain firms (i.e, those export-
ing abroad). In that paper, a macro variable that increases the debt in foreign 
currency is the interest rate differential. In that regard this paper obtains 
comparable results but again only for specific types of firms. 
Benavente et al (2003) also analyzes determinants of foreign-currency 
debt in the case of Chilean companies. The main firm-level regressor is the 
size of the firm. There is no differentiation across different types of firms, 
as it is the case in this paper. Regarding macro variables, financial depth 
measured as total credit over M2 has an effect on foreign-currency debt, 
although the sign of the corresponding coefficient is not the same whether 
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OLS methods are used vis-à-vis other GMM is used (in the first case the 
coefficient is negative, in the other cases the coefficient is positive). It has 
already been mentioned that our measure of financial depth does have an 
influence but for specific types of firms. 
Gozzi et al (2010) analyzes the patterns of fund-raising by companies 
in developed and developing countries, both in domestic markets and in-
ternational markets. A major difference with that paper is that Gozzi et al 
(2010) use very few firms characteristics such as size (total assets), annual 
growth, capital expenditures, capital structure and profitability. 
Brown et al (2011) analyze the determinants of foreign-currency debt 
for small firms in transition economies. That paper also finds (as well as 
this paper) that being an exporter firm increases the incentives to borrow 
in foreign-currency. The same occurs with foreign-owned firms. Yet, that 
paper does not differentiate between financial foreign-currency debt and 
total foreign-currency debt. This differentiation seems relevant in this pa-
per, especially concerning the behavior of exporting firms. 
Mizen et al (2012) analyze the determinants of onshore versus offshore 
debt issues by Asian companies for the period 1995-2007, that is, previous 
to the sub-prime crisis (but including the South-Asian crisis in 1997). In 
that period, the onshore issues increased relative to the offshore market 
issues. Yet, that paper uses somewhat different controls than in this pa-
per, except for leverage and a measure of size. That paper does not look 
at foreign-ownership or export status, for example. Their main result is 
that domestic market depth is a major influence on the decision of issu-
ing debt domestically rather than abroad. In this paper, domestic market 
depth is proxied by the domestic-credit-to-GDP ratio. This last variable 
in our regressions do not seem to be relevant per-se, but only for certain 
firms. For example, in the case of total financial-debt decisions, this vari-
able is significant only when for firms involved in export activities or else 
the largest firms. More closely, results regarding determinants of financial 
foreign-currency debt such variable seems only be relevant for foreign-
owned firms and large firms. Again, the size od the database imposes an 
important limitation when comparing results between papers. 
Finally, Mora et al (2013) presents results on foreign-currency borrow-
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ing for Lebanese companies. That paper does consider the export status 
explicitly. That paper finds that being an exporter increases the probability 
of having debt in foreign-currency. As stated above, this paper finds some-
what a slightly more subtle result: the behavior of the average export firm 
is not the same when considering total debt in foreign currency than in the 
case of financial foreign-currency debt. The rest of the control in Mora et 
al (2013) are different from those used in this paper, so the main compara-
bility criterion is the behavior exporters regarding foreign currency debt. 
II. Concluding remarks
This note presented new evidence on the incentives to borrow in foreign 
currency by non-financial public companies in six major Latin American 
countries. Results indicate differencing between total and financial debt in 
foreign currency may be important, especially for economies with export-
ing or foreign-owned companies. The effects of different variables on each 
of those two types of foreign-currency liabilities may be very different 
(even the opposite) across them. This means that other types of liabilities 
such as trade debt may play important roles in understanding the behav-
ior of firms regarding foreign-currency debt.
There is clearly room for future research in different directions. First, 
the size of the database is clearly an issue. There is a need of widening 
the scope of firms, although the latter is clearly limited to information 
availability. Provided such additional information could be found, there 
are firm-level variables that are not considered in this paper that could 
be used as regressors in future papers. For example, specific firm-level, 
corporate-governance indicators such as one share-one vote may be used 
to understand their possible role in issuing debt in foreign currency. 
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